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EVIDENCE
Charles E. Friend*
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In terms of evidence legislation, the most significant develop-
ment of the past year may be what did not happen in Virginia. In
late 1987 the Supreme Court of Virginia, following a long period of
careful study, recommended against the adoption of a statutory
code of evidence for Virginia. In announcing the court's conclusion,
Chief Justice Carrico cited a passage from the 1987 Annual Survey
of Virginia Law, which stated: "When it comes to the formulation
of rules of evidence, the common-law system of judge-made rules,
supplemented by a steady flow of case opinions from competent
appellate courts, is far superior to any other system of evidence."1
Virginia will therefore apparently retain its traditional common-
law system of evidence law for the immediate future.
The General Assembly has, however, added some new individual
provisions to our rules of evidence during the past months. For
example:
A. Expert Witnesses in the Courtroom
A 1987 amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-375 provides
that "[w]here expert witnesses are to testify in the case, the court
may, at the request of all parties, allow one expert witness for each
party to remain in the courtroom."2
The practice of permitting experts to remain in the courtroom
for the purpose of hearing evidence was permitted at common law;
after listening to the testimony of other witnesses, the expert was
then permitted to take the stand and express an opinion based
upon the evidence heard. This basis for expert opinion, althoigh
* Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason University; B.A., 1957, George Washington
University; J.D., 1969, College of William and Mary.
1. Friend, Evidence: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 775, 788 (1987).
See Statutory Codes of Evidence: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Fortunately Not Yet Come,
V. EVIDENCE REP., January 1988, at 8.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-375 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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recognized by the common law, was eliminated in Virginia by ear-
lier statutory enactments which rendered the exclusion of virtually
all witnesses mandatory upon motion of either party.'
The new amendment to section 8.01-375 now makes it possible
for this basis of expert opinion to be utilized in Virginia. Note,
however, that:
1. The amendment applies only to civil cases.4
2. All parties must request that the expert be allowed to remain.
3. The judge is not compelled to honor the request. The statute
says only that the judge "may" allow experts to remain in the
courtroom.
Despite these limitations, the amendment does at least reintro-
duce this basis of expert opinion to our law.
B. Copies of Employment Records
The 1987 General Assembly also added section 8.01-413.1 to the
Code. This section provides that in any case where original em-
ployment records are or would be admissible, copies of the records
are also admissible, provided that they are authenticated "by the
individual who would have authority to release or produce in court
the original records."5
Note that, like many other statutes dealing with the admissibil-
ity of documents,6 this section makes the copies admissible only if
the originals would be admissible under some existing rule of evi-
dence. The statute is, in effect, a best evidence rule exception; it
does not make the original documents themselves admissible."
C. Dead Man's Statute
The much-amended and ever-confusing "dead man's statute" re-
ceived some additional attention from the 1988 General Assembly.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-375, 19.2-265.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984). The named exceptions did
not include expert witnesses.
4. The amendment refers in terms to "any civil case." No equivalent provision was
added to § 19.2-265.1.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
6. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (copies of medical records); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-391 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (copies of official and business records).
7. The business records and/or official records exceptions to the hearsay rule may, of
course, make the originals admissible even in the absence of a statute.
[Vol. 22:621
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The statute provides that "[iln an action by or against a person
who, from any cause, is incapable of testifying," (a) no judgment
may be rendered in favor of "an adverse or interested party"
founded upon such party's uncorroborated testimony, and (b) the
hearsay statements of the party incapable of testifying are admissi-
ble, whether the other party testifies or not.'
The 1988 amendment added a final sentence to the statute, as
follows: "The phrase 'from any cause' as used in this section shall
not include situations in which the party who is incapable of testi-
fying has rendered himself unable to testify by an intentional self-
inflicted injury."9
This language may require some judicial interpretation. For ex-
ample, what constitutes "injury"? Would this term include, e.g.,
disabilities induced by consumption of drugs or alcohol? And could
such an "injury" be considered to be "intentional"? It will be in-
teresting to see what construction the courts will put upon the
amendment.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
There have been many decisions during the past year which
have addressed evidentiary questions. Hearsay and impeachment
and support of witnesses are areas which have received special at-
tention from our appellate courts in 1987-88.
A. Hearsay: Excited Utterances
Among the most significant developments are those which have
affected the excited utterances exception to the hearsay rule.
This exception began life in Virginia as one variant of the infa-
mous "res gestae" exception, and some of the early perplexity over
the nature of the hearsay exception for excited utterances is trace-
able to this unfortunate ancestry.
Shorn of its Latin label and re-christened as "the excited utter-
ances exception," the rule itself is fairly simple. Essentially, it pro-
vides that testimony about the statement of any person, whether
that person is available at the trial or not, is admissible if the
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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statement is uttered while the declarant is in a state of excitement
caused by the occurrence of a startling event.10
The rationale of the exception is that such unguarded, unpre-
meditated statements, uttered in the heat of the moment, are more
reliable than other types of hearsay because the statements are ut-
tered without conscious thought or preparation, and before there is
any opportunity to fabricate. The focus is (or at least ought to be)
on one issue: At the time of the making of the statement, was the
declarant still in such a state of excitement that the utterance was
still "the facts talking through the party" and not "the party talk-
ing about the facts"? 1
However, Virginia's appellate courts have also consistently fast-
ened their attention upon two other elements: spontaneity and
lapse of time. Thus, admissibility in Virginia has, historically, de-
pended upon (a) whether the declaration was made spontaneously
or in response to questioning, and (b) how much time had elapsed
between the startling event and the utterance of the statement. On
both questions, the Virginia courts have traditionally taken a very
strict position. However, two recent cases have cast these elements
in a new light.
1. Spontaneity
The Supreme Court of Virginia has in the past rejected utter-
ances made in response to even the most abbreviated or casual
questioning. Even such a normal and natural inquiry as the ques-
tion "What happened?" has, in the view of earlier justices, ren-
dered the response inadmissible. 2
The Court of Appeals was the first to depart from this pattern of
exclusion. In the 1987 decision in Martin v. Commonwealth 3 the
court held that the fact that the utterance was made in response to
the question "What happened?" did not render the statement
inadmissible, saying: "The natural reaction of any person arriving
to aid one exposed to a startling event is to inquire, 'What hap-
pened?' To pivot the admissibility of a subsequent statement, how-
10. Kuckenbecker v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 619, 101 S.E.2d 523 (1958).
11. Upton v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 654, 657-58, 2 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1939). This is prob-
ably the most-quoted statement about the excited utterances rule.
12. See, e.g., Kuckenbecker v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 619, 620, 101 S.E.2d 523, 525
(witness spoke to declarant and "asked him what had happened"-held inadmissible).
13. 4 Va. App. 438, 358 S.E.2d 415 (1987).
[Vol. 22:621
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ever spontaneous, on the question of whether it was prompted by
an equally spontaneous inquiry would serve no useful purpose
"14
When rendered, this decision appeared to be contrary to much
of the existing Virginia case precedent. However, on April 22, 1988,
the Supreme Court of Virginia handed down its decision in Clark
v. Commonwealth,15 in which the victim of a shooting had re-
sponded to the question "What happened, Mac?" with a statement
which the trial court admitted into evidence. The Supreme Court
held that, under the circumstances of the case, the statement was
in fact admissible as an excited utterance despite the question.
This does not mean that the "spontaneity" requirement has
been abolished, however. As the Court of Appeals noted in Martin,
"[i]f the question or questioner suggested or influenced the re-
sponse, then the declaration may lack the necessary reliability to
be admitted. [In this case, the witness's] inquiry did not suggest
the content of [the declarant's] response or corrupt its
reliability.""6
2. Time Lapse
The Virginia courts have also traditionally been very strict as to
the length of time which may elapse between incident and utter-
ance before the utterance becomes disqualified for admission
under the exception. Sample holdings:
1. Doe v. Thomas 17 (18 hours, rejected).
2. Brown v. Peters,1 8 (statement made the next morning
rejected).
3. Leybourne v. Commonwealth, 9 (4 hours, rejected).
4. Portsmouth Transit Co. v. Brickhouse, °  (20 minutes,
rejected).
14. Id. at 442, 358 S.E.2d at 418 (1987) (quoting People v. Edwards, 47 N.Y.2d 493, 498-
99, 392 N.E.2d 1229, 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (1979)).
15. No. 870187, slip op., (Va. April 22, 1988).
16. Martin, 4 Va. App. at 442, 358 S.E.2d at 418.
17. 227 Va. 466, 318 S.E.2d 382 (1984).
18. 202 Va. 382, 117 S.E.2d 695 (1961).
19. 222 Va. 374, 282 S.E.2d 12 (1981).
20. 200 Va. 844, 108 S.E.2d 385 (1959).
19881
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5. Goins v. Commonwealth,21 (10-15 minutes, rejected).
6. Nicholaou v. Harrington,22 (6-7 minutes, rejected).
7. Clark v. Commonwealth,23 (5-10 minutes, rejected (although
admissible under another theory)).
In some of these cases, factors other than time were operat-
ing-e.g., the statements were in response to some form of ques-
tioning-but the cases indicate the attitude of Virginia's appellate
courts as to the importance of the passage of time in evaluating the
admissibility of these utterances.
The result of these cases has been an invisible "five-minute bar-
rier." Excited utterances made more than five minutes after the
event have consistently been held inadmissible in Virginia, and it
was in part on this basis that the Court of Appeals, when it was
considering the Clark case, held that the statement in that case
was not admissible as an excited utterance. 4
Despite this apparent "five-minute barrier," however, no "offi-
cial" or absolute time limit has ever been set by our courts as a
maximum beyond which no statement will be considered. This is,
of course, due to the fact that the time element does not stand in
isolation, but must be considered in conjunction with other fac-
tors-questioning, self-serving nature, capacity of the declarant to
fabricate, etc. This led at least one commentator to observe that:
[I]t seems safe to say that counsel will encounter resistance in most
courts to the admission of any statement uttered more than five
minutes or so after the event. Statements uttered after longer peri-
ods will probably be inadmissible unless the lack of questioning, the
incapacity of the declarant to fabricate, the degree of excitement,
or other factors strongly support the spontaneity, and therefore the
trustworthiness, of the statement.25
The importance of these elements in breaking the unofficial
"five-minute barrier" was borne out when the Supreme Court in
21. 218 Va. 285, 237 S.E.2d 136 (1977).
22. 217 Va. 618, 231 S.E.2d 318 (1977).
23. 3 Va. App. 474, 351 S.E.2d 421 (1986).
24. Clark v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 474, 351 S.E.2d 42 (1986) (the statement was
admitted on another basis, however).
25. C. FRIEND, VIRGINIA EVIDENCE LAw-THE FIvE KEYS TO SuccEss 62 (1988) (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 22:621
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Clark v. Commonwealth, 6 referred to above, unexpectedly found a
statement made more than five minutes after the event to be ad-
missible as an excited utterance. Said the court:
Here, the trial judge properly concluded under the evidence that the
statement was made "within as little as five minutes" after the
shooting and "quite probably not more [than] ten minutes after he
was shot." In addition, the trial judge accurately decided that the
state of the victim's physical condition and emotional stability
"must be considered along with the time frame ....
Considering all the circumstances surrounding the statement, we
hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admit-
ting the declaration as an excited utterance. The victim had been
mortally wounded, he was suffering from the trauma, he was in or
approaching a state of shock, and his emotional stability was tenu-
ous at most. The statement was ... part of the instinctive reaction
to a horrifying event.
2 7
Thus it appears that there is in reality no "five-minute barrier,"
and that, in a proper case, utterances made more than five minutes
after the event can and will be admitted.
B. Hearsay: State-of-Mind Exception
The state-of-mind exception provides that hearsay testimony
about statements which are probative of the declarant's state of
mind is admissible.2" The requirements of this exception are usu-
ally stated to be:
1. The statement must refer to the declarant's present state of
mind,29
2. The statement must refer to the declarant's own state of
mind,30 and
26. No. 870187, slip op., (Va. April 22, 1988).
27. Id. at 8-9.
28. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694
(1953); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 598, 347 S.E.2d 163 (1986).
29. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the requirements of the state-of-mind
exception, see the opinion of Koontz, C.J., in Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App.
188, 361 S.E.2d 436 (1987).
30. Evidence of out-of-court statements is also admissible to show the state of mind
which the statement induced in the hearer. See, e.g., Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App.
283, 362 S.E.2d 193 (1987). Technically, these statements are not hearsay at all since they
are not introduced to prove that what was said was true, but rather to show their effect
1988]
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3. There must be no obvious indication of falsity.31
There is, however, another requirement-one which is often
overlooked in treatises and articles, but which causes great diffi-
culty for the courts in practice. The requirement is that, in addi-
tion to meeting the foregoing conditions, the declaration must be
relevant and material to the case.
The state-of-mind declaration, to be admissible, must be both rele-
vant and material-that is, (a) the words used by the declarant must
have some tendency to show the declarant's state of mind, and (b)
the declarant's state of mind must be material to the case. This re-
quirement seems obvious enough, since all evidence, to be admissi-
ble, must be relevant to a material issue. Yet it is this principle
which gives rise to the most complex and difficult questions when
the state-of-mind exception is invoked during a trial.32
The first question to be dealt with is the relevance of the state-
ment to show the declarant's state of mind. We must determine
whether the words used by the declarant do in fact tend to show
what the declarant's state of mind was." If we cannot justifiably
make that inference, then the declaration is inadmissible. In other
words, the "state-of-mind" exception does not apply unless the
words do in fact reveal, or at least have some tendency to reveal,
the declarant's state of mind.
However, even if we find that the words do indeed reveal the
declarant's state of mind, we must still determine whether the de-
clarant's state of mind is material to the case, for the statement is
still not admissible if the state of mind which the statement
reveals has no bearing on the case at bar.
In some instances, the state of mind of the declarant is directly
in issue, because it is itself an element of the case; in such situa-
upon another person. See C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA, § 225 (2d ed. 1983).
31. See C. FRIEND, supra note 30, § 238.
32. C. FRIEND, supra note 25, at 69-70.
33. For example:
When Scrooge says "I hate Christmas", this clearly reveals Scrooge's state of mind,
since he has expressly stated an emotion. However, if Scrooge's only statement is
"Bah, humbug!", the court must decide whether these words do in fact show-or tend
to show-the underlying state of mind. The question is might we justifiably infer
from the words "Bah, humbug" that Scrooge hates Christmas? If so, then the decla-
ration is relevant, and, if otherwise admissible, may be admitted.
C. FRIEND, supra note 25, at 70.
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tions, the materiality of the state-of-mind declaration is obvious.
In other cases the state of mind of the person is not directly at
issue, but is offered into evidence in an attempt to establish some
other issue in the case.34 It is this second situation-state of mind
not directly in issue, but probative of some other matter which is
at issue-which poses the most perplexing problems for lawyers
and judges.
Curiously, these principles are very seldom discussed in the ap-
pellate opinions. However, in the recent case of Evans-Smith v.
Commonwealth,5 the Court of Appeals considered this problem at
some length in a very helpful opinion which deserves mention here.
In Evans-Smith, the court was considering the admissibility of evi-
dence of the homicide victim's fear of the accused, her husband.
The court said:
Whether [the victim] feared her husband was probative of neither
his motive or intent nor of the ultimate issue in the case, namely,
whether [the accused] murdered [the victim]....
A victim's state of mind would be relevant in cases where the de-
fense contends that the death was the result of suicide, accident or
self-defense. In those cases, hearsay statements made by the victim
illustrating his or her state of mind would be relevant, material and
admissible .... Here, however, the defense did not contend that
[the victim's] death was the result of suicide, accident or self-de-
fense. Therefore, these statements were immaterial and inadmissible
36
The court went on to point out that:
Even if we were to hold that [the victim's] fear of her husband
was material, we find that this evidence was not probative of fear,
and therefore not relevant. The victim's statements that her hus-
band was becoming testier and more violent may have indicated a
strained and disagreeable relationship, but that did not tend to
prove her fear of him.37
34. See, e.g., Church v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 208, 211, 335 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1985)
(child's statement that child believed sex was "dirty, nasty, and it hurt" offered as circum-
stantial evidence that the child had been molested).
35. 5 Va. App. 188, 361 S.E.2d 436 (1987).
36. Id. at 198, 361 S.E.2d at 442. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 198-99, 361 S.E.2d at 442.
1988] 629EVIDENCE
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Thus, the court held that the evidence offered to show the victim
was in fear of the accused failed on both counts: It did not show
that she was in fear of him, and, in any event, her fear, if it ex-
isted, was not material to the case. This two-pronged
test-relevance of the evidence to show state of mind, and materi-
ality of the state of mind to the case-must be satisfied whenever
state-of-mind declarations are offered. Otherwise, the declaration,
although it meets all other requirements of the exception, will be
inadmissible.
C. Hearsay: Business Records Rule
The business records exception to the hearsay rule generates
considerable appellate case law. It is a complicated exception, and
not many years go by without one or the other of our appellate
courts being called upon to interpret its requirements. Among its
many requirements:
1. The records must be business records.3 8
2. The entry must have been made routinely, in the ordinary
course of business.39
3. The entry must have been made at or near the time of the
transaction.40
4. The entry must have been made by a person whose duty it
was to make the entry.4'
5. The entry must be authenticated by some witness, such as
the supervisor or custodian responsible for maintaining the
records.42
6. The documents must be records of the type which are relied
38. C. FRIEND, supra note 30, § 235 (cited in Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557,
567, 318 S.E.2d 386, 392 (1984)). However, the business may be non-profit or charitable.
39. Id. It is the routine nature of the transactions which give this exception its "guaran-
tee of trustworthiness." Therefore, the entry must be made by one whose duty it is to make
such entries; an entry made by an unauthorized person is not a routine entry.
40. Id. There is no set time limit. However, entries made after an unusually long time
are inadmissible because, among other things, they can no longer be considered routine. See
Ratliff v. Jewell, 153 Va. 315, 149 S.E. 409 (1927).
41. Simpson, 227 Va. at 557, 318 S.E.2d at 386. Entries made without authority, or con-
trary to the employer's instructions, are not admissible under this exception. An entry made
by someone who is not the proper person to make that entry may be regarded as
unauthorized.
42. Id.
[Vol. 22:621630
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upon by those who prepare them or for whom they are prepared.43
One question which occasionally arises in connection with this
exception is: Must the party offering the records into evidence be
able to identify the persons who made the entries in question?
This is a serious consideration, for such identification may not al-
ways be easy. However, in Avocet Development Corp. v. McLean
Bank,4 the Supreme Court of Virginia answered that question in
the negative.
In Avocet, the document at issue was a bank ledger sheet. The
opponent objected to its admissibility as a business record because
the custodian produced by the proponent to authenticate the doc-
ument (as required by the rule) could not name the various em-
ployees who posted the ledger. The court said:
The bank proved that the document came from the proper custo-
dian, that it was a record kept in the ordinary course of business,
that it was made contemporaneously with the event by persons hav-
ing the duty to keep a true record, and that it was relied upon by
those for whom it was prepared. This was sufficient foundation for
admission of the ledger in evidence.45
The decision is an important one, not only because it comports
with the spirit and purpose of the business records rule, but also
because a contrary finding would almost certainly have had an ex-
tremely adverse effect upon the business records exception in Vir-
ginia. It is often difficult and burdensome to identify a particular
entrant; in a large modern business it may be impossible. Further-
more, the business records rule was developed, at least in part, to
lighten the burden of proving business transactions. Had the Su-
preme Court ruled that the exception is inapplicable unless the
proponent can identify by name the persons who made the entries
at issue, the rule's usefulness would have been severely curtailed.
It is, of course, always open to the opponent to establish that the
entrant was in fact a person who was not authorized to make the
entry, etc. This has historically been considered to be a matter for
the opponent to raise, and so the ruling in Avocet in no way
43. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Coley & Petersen, 219 Va. 781, 250 S.E.2d 765
(1979).
44. 234 Va. 658, 364 S.E.2d 757 (1988).
45. Id. at 667, 364 S.E.2d at 762.
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reduces the opponent's traditional ability to oppose the admission
of the record in an appropriate case.
D. Prior Inconsistent Statements of a Party's Own Witness
1. Impeachment of a Witness Who Proves "Adverse"-Virginia
Code Section 8.01-403
Despite the old cliche that one may not "impeach his own wit-
ness," the common law permitted limited impeachment of one's
own witness when a witness unexpectedly changed stories in mid-
stream. Under such circumstances, the party who called the wit-
ness was entitled to introduce evidence of the witness's prior in-
consistent statement. This provision of the common law has been
codified in Virginia Code section 8.01-403,46 which applies in both
civil and criminal cases. The section provides that "in case the wit-
ness shall in the opinion of the court prove adverse," the calling
party may show the prior statement.
However, Brown v. Commonwealth,4 8 a 1988 court of appeals
case, reminds us that it is not enough that the witness testifies in a
manner that is inconsistent with a prior statement. Citing earlier
Virginia cases, the court said:
In order to impeach one's own witness ... it is not sufficient merely
that the witness gave a contradictory statement on a prior occasion.
Nor is it sufficient that the testimony of the witness fails to meet the
expectations of the party calling him. In order to be impeachable,
the testimony offered must be injurious or damaging to the case of
the party who called the witness.49
In Brown, a prosecution witness testified that he did not know
either the victim or the accused, and did not see the attack upon
the victim. This was in direct contradiction of his prior statement
to authorities that he knew both men and had seen the attack. The
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-403 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
47. "A party producing a witness ... may, in case the witness shall in the opinion of the
court prove adverse .... prove that he has made at other times a statement incon-
sistent with his present testimony .... In every such case the court, if requested by
either party, shall instruct the jury not to consider the evidence of such inconsistent
statements, except for the purpose of contradicting the witness."
Id.
48. 6 Va. App. 82, 366 S.E.2d 716 (1988).
49. Id. at 85, 366 S.E.2d at 718 (emphasis added).
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Commonwealth, over defense objection, introduced evidence of the
prior statement. The Court of Appeals reversed, saying: "If the tes-
timony sought to be impeached is of a negative character and has
no probative value, there is no statutory basis for impeachment."5
The court noted that the witness's testimony-that he did not
see the attack and did not know the men involved-was of this
character and therefore had no probative value: "It could not have
assisted the trier of fact in determining [the accused's] guilt or in-
nocence. Having no probative value, it was not damaging or injuri-
ous to the Commonwealth's case." 51
The court concluded that it was therefore improper to allow the
introduction of evidence of the prior inconsistent statement.
Thus, before section 8.01-403 can be invoked to permit counsel
to impeach his/her own witness, counsel must persuade the trial
judge that the testimony of the witness has been "damaging or in-
jurious" to counsel's case. Further, it appears that to be "damaging
or injurious," the testimony must have had "probative value," i.e.,
some tendency to establish some material issue in the case, such as
the guilt or innocence of the accused, or the liability, or lack
thereof, of the defendant in a civil case. Since purely negative tes-
timony by definition has no probative value,52 such evidence can
never be the basis for invoking the statute and showing the wit-
ness's prior statement.
However, it should be remembered that there is a distinction be-
tween "negative-negative" evidence and "positive-negative" evi-
dence. If a witness testifies that "I did not see the fight," that is
"negative-negative" evidence; the witness is saying, in effect,
"There may have been a fight, but I didn't see it." On the other
hand, if the witness testifies that "I was standing right there
watching the two men and I didn't see either of them strike a
blow," that is "positive-negative" evidence, for the witness is say-
ing in effect "there was no fight because I was right there and if
there had been a fight I would have seen it.""5 The distinction is
50. Id. (citing Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Hall, 184 Va. 102, 34 S.E.2d 382 (1945)).
51. 6 Va. App. at 86, 366 S.E.2d at 719.
52. See C. FRIEND, supra note 30, § 143.
53. The terms "positive-negative evidence" and "negative-negative evidence" are the in-
ventions of the author; they are not officially sanctioned by our courts.
1988] 633EVIDENCE
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important, for while "negative-negative" evidence does not have
probative value, "positive-negative" evidence does; had the witness
in Brown given "positive-negative" evidence of the type described
in the example above, this (a) would have had probative value, (b)
would (presumably) have been "damaging or injurious" to the
Commonwealth's case, and therefore (c) would have made it possi-
ble for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the witness's
prior inconsistent statement.
2. Refreshment of Witness's Memory by Use of Prior Statement
The common law also permits the use of prior statements to "re-
fresh the memory" of a witness who has developed memory
problems. Refreshment of memory is not usually thought of as im-
peachment, and there is no requirement that the witness "prove
adverse" before refreshment can occur. 4 However, the 1987 case of
Royal v. Commonwealth5 illustrates the very fine line between re-
freshment and impeachment.
In Royal, the witness's testimony conflicted with a prior state-
ment which she had given to the police. Because of the disclosure
of the prior statement to the jury, the defense asked for an instruc-
tion cautioning the jury that the prior statement was to be consid-
ered for impeachment purposes only and was not proof that what
the witness said was true. The trial court refused the instruction
and the court of appeals affirmed, noting that the prior statement
was not admitted for the purpose of attacking the witness's credi-
bility, but rather for the limited purpose of refreshing the witness's
memory.5 6 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed,
saying:
[W]hile the prosecutor used the prior statement ostensibly to "re-
fresh" the witness' memory, the content of the statement was re-
vealed to the jury. The effect of the revelation was to present to the
jury the earlier conflicting assertion ... a crucial fact in the case.
... Under these circumstances, the court had a duty to give the
cautionary instruction. . .. "
54. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
55. 234 Va. 403, 362 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
56. Royal v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 59, 341 S.E.2d 660 (1986), rev'd, 234 Va. 403,
362 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
57. 234 Va. at 406, 362 S.E.2d at 324.
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Although other factors in the case contributed to the Supreme
Court's view that the failure to give the instruction was reversible
error, the decision must be regarded as a warning that, even when
a prior inconsistent statement is offered under the appellation "re-
freshment of memory," a cautionary instruction may be necessary
to avoid (or at least reduce) the possibility that the jury will con-
sider the "refreshment" as substantive evidence.
E. Supporting Witness who Has Not Been Impeached
One of the more troublesome problems in Virginia evidence law
has been the confusion over the supposed right of a party-usually
the accused in a criminal case-to introduce evidence of his or her
own veracity when there has been no attempt to impeach his/her
credibility. This confusion, which usually can be traced back to a
failure to differentiate between character evidence for impeach-
ment and character evidence for substantive purposes, often re-
sults in an accused being permitted to offer evidence in support of
his own credibility when no impeachment has occurred, and often
even before the accused has testified.
It is therefore always a pleasure to see cases like Reed v. Com-
monwealth,58 a 1988 Court of Appeals case in which the defense
contended that the trial court denied him the right to call for evi-
dence in his favor when it excluded the evidence of several wit-
nesses who were prepared to testify that the accused's prior convic-
tion was based on perjured testimony. The accused had not
testified at the time that these witnesses were offered, and indeed,
did not testify at any time during the trial. However, the accused
claimed that the trial court's action prevented him from testifying
due to his fear that the prior conviction would be shown against
him.
It is well established that a witness whose testimony is im-
peached by evidence of prior convictions has the right to offer a
brief explanation of the convictions shown." In this instance, had
the accused been impeached by such evidence, the accused would,
as the court of appeals noted, have had a right to show that the
convictions were obtained on the basis of perjured testimony.60
58. 6 Va. App. 65, 366 S.E.2d 274 (1988).
59. See C. FRIEND, supra note 30, § 27.
60. 6 Va. App. at 68, 366 S.E.2d at 276 (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1112,
172 S.E. 286 (1934)).
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However, a witness cannot be impeached until the witness has tes-
tified, and until the witness has been impeached by a showing of
prior convictions, the accused has no right to explain those convic-
tions. As the Court of Appeals put it: "When [the accused] failed
to testify, evidence of his prior conviction was irrelevant, immate-
rial and thus inadmissible. Likewise, evidence tending to explain
the conviction was irrelevant, immaterial and inadmissible. Thus,
[the accused] was not denied his right to call for relevant, admissi-
ble evidence in his favor. 1
The point is an important one. Virginia decisional law is liberally
sprinkled with cases in which criminal defendants who have not
taken the stand have sought to introduce evidence to support their
own credibility. All too often, this has been permitted.2 In fact (or,
rather, in law) it is impermissible, and the opinion in Reed may
help Virginia's trial judges in their efforts to prevent it from
occurring.
III. CONCLUSION
In the course of a year there are, of course, many decisions on
points of evidence law, and they are all important. The foregoing is
only a selection of cases (and statutes) that have been added to our
law during 1987-88. Once again, however, the wisdom of the com-
mon-law system has been demonstrated "by a steady flow of case
opinions from competent appellate courts,"63 whose efforts con-
tinue to illuminate and perfect Virginia evidence law.
61. 6 Va. App. at 69, 366 S.E.2d at 277.
62. See Supporting Your Witness With Character Evidence, VA. EVIDENCE REP. Novem-
ber 1987, at 6.
63. Friend, Evidence: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 775, 778
(1987).
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